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1 
Waiting	  for	  the	  Existential	  
Revolution	  in	  Europe	  	  
Jan	  Komárek ∗	  
Revised	  draft	  submitted	  to	  ICON	   25/11/2013	  
This essay argues, contrary to the widespread beliefs that prevailed after 1989, that the 
experience of post-communist countries and their peoples, both before and after 1989, can 
bring something new to our understanding of Europe’s present predicament: sometimes as 
inspiration, sometimes as a cautionary tale. The lessons offered by post-communist Europe 
concern some deeply held convictions about the very nature of the EU and its constitutional 
structure. Only if this experience is absorbed in Europe as its own will post-communist 
countries truly return to Europe – and Europe become truly united. 
The cautionary tales of post-communist Europe concern the worrying consequences of the 
suppression of social conflicts ‘in the name of Europe’. Such conflicts get often translated 
into identitary politics, which in the context of European integration often turn against the 
Union. The second lesson concerns the ill fate of Havel’s existential revolution. The attempts 
of some European constitutionalists to reform individualistic emphasis of the integration 
project are problematic for the same reason: they turn attention from politics, where real 
solutions need to be found. This relates to the third suggestion made here: that the experience 
of living in a collective dream of socialism can be used as an inspiration rather than as 
something that needs to be erased from the collective memory of Europe.  
 
Central Europe ‘could approach a rich Western Europe not as a 
poor dissident or a helpless, amnestied prisoner, but as someone 
who also brings something with him: namely spiritual and moral 
incentives, bold peace initiatives, untapped creative potential, the 
ethos of freshly gained freedom, and the inspiration for brave and 
swift solutions’.  
Václav Havel, 21 January 19901 
                                                
∗ Assistant Professor in EU law, European Institute and Department of Law, London School of Economics and 
Political Science; Franz Weyr Fellow, CeLAPA, Prague. J.Komarek@lse.ac.uk. I am indebted to all participants 
at the conference entitled ‘Revisiting Van Gend en Loos’, Paris 26-27 June 2013, who provided helpful 
comments on and criticisms of the previous version of this paper. I would also like to thank Marco Dani, Floris 
de Witte, Alexander Somek, and Matej Avbelj for their feedback on the present article, which was written while 
I was the first Franz Weyr Fellow at Centre for Law and Public Affairs (CeLAPA), created under subsidies for a 
long-term conceptual development of the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech 
Republic, v.v.i. (RVO: 68378122). All errors of course remain my responsibility.  
2 
Introduction	  
Contrary to what Václav Havel hoped in 1990, a belief that there was nothing to learn from 
post-communist countries prevailed in the West.2 The French historian François Furet put it 
bluntly: ‘With all the fuss and noise, not a single new idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 
1989’.3 The ‘existential revolution’ called for by dissident Havel in his famous 1978 essay 
‘The Power of the Powerless’ did not happen – either in the West, or in Havel’s homeland.4 
Instead, the West took 1989 as ‘a restatement of the value of what [it] already [had], of old 
truths and tested models’,5 and the people in post-communist Europe swiftly accepted it. The 
only way to freedom and prosperity seemed to be by way of liberal democracy and market 
economy. 1989 marked the ‘end of history’.6  
Today, Europe finds itself in deep crisis: economic, political, but most of all, spiritual. The 
pressure of ‘a new global race of nations’, as the British Prime Minister put it in his EU 
Speech,7 determines how Europeans (should) live today. China, not America, seems to be the 
relevant Other, against which Europe is going to define itself. As a result, its citizens are 
‘sidelined and numbed by the repetitive talk of austerity and economic stability, financial 
leverage and institutional reforms’.8 Imaginative political language is rare; instead, 
economists (and economism) occupy public discourse. To add to these problems, some 
former post-communist countries seem to be ‘sliding back to authoritarianism’9 and the Union 
is uncertain about how to react. Thinking that these developments reflect ‘a deep-seated 
nationalism’ or ‘a feeling of resentment and victimization’10 is however only partly true. After 
                                                                                                                                                   
1 Speech to the Polish Sejm and Senate, published as ‘The Future of Central Europe’, New York Review of 
Books, 29 March 1990 (available online at http://vaclavhavel.cz, where all other texts by Havel quoted here can 
be found).  
2 I use the expression ‘the West’ metaphorically to denote the countries which were on the non-communist side 
of the Iron Curtain. Since the fall of the Curtain, the border between East and West has become contested. See 
Michał Buchowski, ‘The Specter of Orientalism in Europe: From Exotic Other to Stigmatized Brother’ (2006) 
79 Anthropological Quarterly 463-482, 464-465.  
3 Reported in Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers 2005 [1990]), 27, who expressed the same view together with numerous other observers 
from the West: see Barbara J Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals 
and Philosopher Kings (Budapest and New York, CEU Press 2003), 335-337 (mentioning Timothy Garton Ash, 
Jürgen Habermas or Stephen Holmes).  
4 Václav Havel (transl. by Paul Wilson), in Jan Vladislav (ed), Václav Havel or Living in Truth (London: Faber 
and Faber 1986, 36-122. After 1989, the most articulate formulation of what this revolution should entail was 
given in Havel’s speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress on 21 February 1990 in Washington. On Havel’s 
‘existential revolution’ see Aviezer Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to 
Havel (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 2000), 161-165; on Havel’s Washington speech see ibid, 174-
183.  
5 Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and 
Prague (New York: Vintage Books 1999 [1990]), 156. 
6 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Basic Books 1992).  
7 Speech given on 23 January 2013 at Bloomberg available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/eu-speech-at-
bloomberg/.  
8 See the manifesto ‘Ending the Honeymoon: Constructing Europe beyond the Market’, available at 
http://regenerationeurope.eu, composed by Moritz Hartmann and Floris de Witte. The manifesto gave rise to a 
special issue of (2013) German Law Journal No 5, edited by its authors.  
9 See Jan Werner Müller, ‘Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order’ 
Transatlantic Academy Paper Series 2012-2013 No. 3, http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/ 
safeguarding-democracy-inside-eu-brussels-and-future-liberal-order and the discussion at Verfassungsblog.de, 
‘Ungarn - was tun?’, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/category/schwerpunkte/antworten-auf-ungarn/.  
10 Both quotations come from Jan Werner Müller, ‘The Hungarian Tragedy’ Dissent, Spring 2011, 5-10, 7.  
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all, the state of democratic politics in some ‘old’ EU Member States is equally worrying and 
the EU’s approach to its crisis is far from democratic.11  
This essay argues, contrary to the widespread beliefs that prevailed after 1989, that the 
experience of post-communist countries and their peoples, both before and after 1989, can 
bring something new to our understanding of Europe’s present predicament: sometimes as 
inspiration, sometimes as a cautionary tale. The lessons offered by post-communist Europe 
concern some deeply held convictions about the very nature of the EU and its constitutional 
structure. Only if this experience is absorbed in Europe as its own will post-communist 
countries truly return to Europe – and Europe become truly united.12  
The first three sections, which follow this introduction, deal with some consequences of the 
ideology of the ‘Return to Europe’ for constitutionalism and political culture in post-
communist countries. In section 1 I explain how the ideology of the ‘Return to Europe’ 
quickly silenced voices seeking to find alternatives to market economy and even liberal 
democracy of the West. Section 2 may remind one of numerous ‘enlargement studies’, which 
saw the new Member States mainly as a threat (or at least a challenge) to the EU’s 
constitutional culture. Its main goal is different, however: it is to show the lack of serious 
engagement with problems and conflicts that post-communist countries’ accession to the EU 
would inevitably bring. Such conflicts did not disappear, however. Instead they started to 
emerge after the post-communist countries joined the EU. Section 3 argues that it is the 
repression of social conflicts and the impossibility of translating them into ordinary politics 
that explain the current turn to authoritarianism and nationalism in some post-communist 
countries. Here lies the first lesson to be drawn from post-communist Europe. There is no 
reason to believe that the rest of Europe is different, since it is haunted by the same problem: 
there seems to be ‘no alternative’ to the current policies addressing the crisis, while 
democracy is suspended in the interest of European integration and the survival of the 
Eurozone.13  
This capacity of European integration to deprive democratic politics of alternatives relates to 
a deeper question concerning the nature of European integration and its constitution. Too 
many attempts to conceptualize European integration still avoid social dimension. European 
constitutional theory plays no little part in this. As section 4 shows, at present there are two 
influential, but rather truncated visions of Europe: one presenting Europe as a safeguard of 
peace, democracy and human rights; another seeing the EU through the lenses of an economic 
policy manager that understands the Market as either an area of free trade or a new regulatory 
space. The social question that invokes solidarity and redistribution does not figure among 
such accounts. Section 5 puts this issue into the context of European constitutionalism, 
exemplified by the work of its key proponent, Joseph Weiler. I investigate whether the more 
recent attempts by Weiler to construct a deeper ethos of European integration can be 
                                                
11 See Michael Wilkinson, ‘The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional Crisis of 
the European Union’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 527-560 and also Scharpf, n 13.  
12 That it is not the case now is for example documented by the conspicuous absence of post-communist Europe 
from most ‘big narratives’ of European integration published since 2004. Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The 
Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: OUP 2006) is rather exceptional, but this, I would argue, is 
due to the author’s origins (in Poland). Wojciech Sadurski (Polish by origin) in his recent book 
Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe (Oxford: OUP 2012) presents the Enlargement as a facilitator 
of processes that were taking place in ‘Old Europe’ anyway rather than a source of the EU’s deep transformation 
and rethinking.  
13 See Fritz Scharpf, ‘Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Disabling of Democratic Accountability’ in Armin 
Schäfer and Wolfgang Streeck (eds), Politics in the Age of Austerity (Cambridge: Polity Press 2013), 108-142. 
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somewhat helped by Václav Havel’s call for ‘existential revolution’, discussed in section 6. 
The following section 7 rejects this option, which can be presented as the second important 
lesson of post-communist Europe and its transformation in the 1990s. The coda brings in 
perhaps the deepest – and non-transferable – experience of communism, which goes before 
1989 and is most controversial. It suggest that the living in a ‘collective dream [that] dared to 
imagine a social world in alliance with personal happiness, and promised to adults that its 
realization would be in harmony with the overcoming of scarcity of all’14 should not be 
forgotten as post-communist Europe’s nightmare. It can still inform the EU’s ambition to 
create ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.  
1 In	  the	  Name	  of	  the	  ‘Return	  to	  Europe’	  
After 1989, any alternative which tried to preserve something positive that may have been 
achieved when the ‘really existing socialism’ was being built was firmly rejected. As the 
former grey zone technocrat Václav Klaus quipped in 1990, shortly after he became the 
minister of finance in the first post-communist government of Czechoslovakia,15 the ‘Third 
Way [trying to find a middle way between a socialist planned economy and a capitalist free 
market] is the fastest way to the Third World’.16 He soon took over the leadership of the 
transformation, together with other free market liberals in post-communist Europe supported 
by an army of Western advisers prescribing ‘shock therapy’.17 The dissidents’ notions of civil 
society and antipolitics, transcending both politics and economy,18 were soon dumped by the 
new post-communist elites. Most dissidents left politics soon after 1989 and their place was 
assumed by ‘grey zone’ technocrats and the former members of nomenklatura, who quickly 
learned the new language of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and, of course, market 
economy.19  
It was the language that post-communist Europe had to use if it wanted to ‘return to Europe’ 
from where the region was, in Milan Kundera’s metaphor, ‘kidnapped’ to the East.20 This 
goal was almost immediately translated into ‘joining the EU’ in 1989. An early programmatic 
document of the Czechoslovak opposition thus stated boldly: ‘[w]e are striving for our 
                                                
14 Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: MIT Press 2000), ix. This is also the message of Buden’s book, n 22.  
15 On Klaus’ background in the 1968-1989 era see Gil Eyal, The Origins of Postcommunist Elites: From Prague 
Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press 2003), 78-86.  
16 ‘Third Way, No Way?’, Notes for the World Economic Forum, Davos, 26 January 2000, 
http://www.klaus.cz/clanky/1186., referring to Klaus’ 1990 Davos speech.   
17 A programmatic text can be found in Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘What Is to Be Done’, The Economist, 13 January 1990, 
19-24. On the forceful rejection of the third way in Poland see Dorothee Bohle and Gisela Neunhöffer, ‘Why is 
there no third way?: The role of neoliberal ideology, networks and think tanks in combating market socialism 
and shaping transformation in Poland’ in Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen and Gisela Neunhöffer (eds), 
Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique (London and New York: Routledge 2006), 89-104. East Germany 
must not be forgotten in this context, since ‘East Germans remained the most reluctant converts to the civic 
mission of capitalism’: see Charles S Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East 
Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997), 192. The advocates of what could be called the ‘third 
way’ lost the 1990 elections, however, and East Germany ceased to exist – on the political map at least, if not in 
the minds of its former citizens.  
18 See particularly Falk, n 3, chapter 8, Jeffrey C Isaac, ‘The Meanings of 1989’ (1996) 63 Social Research 291-
344 and David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1990), chapter 2. See text to n 119.  
19 See Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: The New Ruling 
Elites in Eastern Europe (London and New York: Verso 1998).  
20 Milan Kundera, ‘Un occident kidnappé, ou la tragédie de l’Europe centrale’ Le Débat, November 1983, 2-24. 
Kundera speaks of Central Europe’s kidnap from the West, but ‘the West’ meant for most people of 1989 in 
Central Europe ‘Europe’ or ‘the European Union’.  
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country to once again occupy a worthy place in Europe and in the world. … We are counting 
on inclusion into European integration’.21  
The fierce critic of the ‘ideology called transitology’,22 Croatian writer Boris Buden, shows 
that the Return to Europe was a matter of culture too. Since the liberal-democratic capitalist 
system represents the purest cultural embodiment of modernity, and the Soviet-style 
totalitarianism its total negation,23 post-communist Europe found itself helplessly left behind. 
All it could do was to ‘rectify’24 the past forty years of communism and spend the years after 
1989 in the ‘misery of catching-up’ with the West.25  
The more spiritual reasons for the reunification of post-communist Europe with the West 
were soon accompanied by more pragmatic ones. The economic protectionism of the EU 
helped to persuade the leaders of post-communist countries to seek full EU membership, 
despite the existing members’ reluctance to admit post-communist countries to their ranks.26 
After they had finally decided to open the club to these countries,27 liberal democracy and 
market economy were the key criteria for membership.28 As the next section argues, they 
became as ‘unquestionable goods’ as socialism was in the pre-1989 period.  
2 Constitutional	  Submission	  	  
The ‘There Is No Alternative’ to the liberal democracy and market economy narrative29 
presented the people in post-communist Europe with something that was disturbingly familiar 
to them. When they lived in ‘really existing socialism’, they were left with no choice but to 
submit to the laws of historical necessity steering them to a better (socialist) future. 
Throughout the 1990s, they were again simple ‘marionettes in a historical process that takes 
place independently of their will and drags them with it to a better future’30 – this time liberal 
democracy and market economy, which awaited at the end of history.  
                                                
21 ‘What We Want’, Civic Forum 26 November 1989. Available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/ 
files/download/1347/fullsize.  
22 Boris Buden, ‘Children of Postcommunism’ (2010) Radical Philosophy No. 159, 18-25. This article is chapter 
2 from Buden’s fascinating book Zone des Übergangs: Vom Ende des Postkommunismus (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp 2009). 
23 See Luciano Pellicani, ‘Modernity and Totalitarianism’ (1998) Telos No. 112, 3-22.  
24 See Jürgen Habermas, ‘What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New 
Thinking on the Left’ (1990) New Left Review I/183, 3-21.  
25 ‘Das Elend des Nachholens’, as the title of chapter 3 of Buden’s book (n 22) reads.  
26 See Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism 
(Oxford: OUP 2005), 82-98.  
27 It was Germany’s self-interest which helped to persuade other governments of the need to offer a realistic 
prospect of full membership to the post-communist countries. See Marcin Zaborowski, ‘More than Simply 
Expanding Markets: Germany and EU Enlargement’ in Helene Sjursen (ed), Questioning EU Enlargement: 
Europe in Search of Identity (London and New York: Routledge 2006), 104-120.  
28 The ‘Copenhagen criteria’, now codified in Article 2 TEU (through reference in Article 49 TEU). On the role 
of the criteria in the process of preparing and negotiating accession see Vachudova, n 26, 95-96 and 121-123.  
29 See Anna Grzymała-Busse and Abby Innes, ‘Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition 
in East central Europe’ (2003) 17 East European Politics and Societies 64-73. For those who do not remember or 
do not know: ‘There Is No Alternative’ was the slogan of Margaret Thatcher, with which she defended her 
neoliberal policies of the 1980s. See Iain McLean, Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric 
and Manipulation from Peel to Blair (Oxford, OUP 2001), chapter 8.  
30 Buden (2010), n 22, 22.  
6 
There is a rich literature concerning the impact of the accession of post-communist countries 
to the EU on the functioning of their political systems.31 Many analysts today agree that while 
post-communist countries were successful in building democratic institutions, they were 
much less so as regards democratic culture – one Czech commentator describes this as 
‘democracy without democrats’.32 Accession to the EU contributed to this in various ways: 
the need to transpose the sheer amount of acquis turned parliaments in post-communist 
countries into ‘approximation machines’, while the political process was not expected to 
generate its own solutions to problems, since they all came from the EU. Some effects, such 
as the empowerment of the executive at the expense of other branches of government or the 
detachment of the supranational norms from societal needs, were not specific to the post-
communist context.  
Attention is also paid to the impact of EU membership on their constitutional culture. As 
regards this aspect, however, the focus is more on the functional needs of European 
integration and the question whether the post-communist constitutionalism would not hamper 
the effectiveness of EU law in the new Member States, rather than whether there was 
something that should remain protected or even taught to the West.33  
Many people, for example, predicted that the EU constitutional orthodoxy would face 
problems in post-communist Europe because of the newly discovered sovereignty. It was 
sometimes said that ‘while Western Europe is leaving the twentieth century for the twenty-
first, Eastern Europe is leaving the twentieth century for the nineteenth’.34 True as these early 
diagnoses could be,35 the challenges that the EU constitutional orthodoxy is now facing in 
some of the Member States have to do with something else. They relate to the ‘There Is No 
Alternative’ narrative. When these countries negotiated their membership, domestic 
constitutional debates (if there were any) mostly dealt with the question of how most 
effectively to give precedence to EU law’s primacy and direct effect.36 Raising the possibility 
of a conflict between their respective normative foundations meant not only joining the ranks 
of domestic Eurosceptics and nationalists, but also appearing helplessly backward: heading 
towards the 19th century.  
Thus when the power of the European Council to suspend the voting rights of a Member State 
which would be violating the EU foundational values was questioned before the Czech 
Constitutional Court, the Court replied that ‘these values were in principle in conformity with 
the values that formed the very foundations of the material core of the constitutional order of 
                                                
31 For an overview see Vachudova, n 26, 224-232. See also the special issue of (2003) 17 East European Politics 
and Societies No. 1, Wojciech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota and Martin Krygier (eds), Spreading Democracy and 
the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-
Communist Legal Orders (Dordrecht: Springer 2006) and Jacques Rupnik and Jan Zielonka, ‘Introduction: The 
State of Democracy 20 Years on: Domestic and External Factors (2013) 27 East European Politics and Societies 
and Cultures 3-25 (introductory essay to a special issue).  
32 Jiří Pehe, Demokracie bez demokratů: Úvahy o společnosti a politice [Democracy without Democrats: 
Thoughts on Society and Politics] (Prague: Prostor 2010).  
33 See especially the numerous contributions in Adam Łazowski (ed), The Application of EU Law in the New 
Member States: Brave New World (The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2010).  
34 Dahrendorf, n 3, 149-150 (Dahrendorf himself did not fully endorse the claim). See for example Wojciech 
Sadurski, ‘Constitutionalization of the EU and the Sovereignty Concerns of the New Accession States: The Role 
of the Charter of Rights’ EUI Working Paper Law 2003/11, http://hdl.handle.net/1814/1363.  
35 I made the same observation in ‘European Constitutional Pluralism and the European Arrest Warrant: 
Contrapunctual Principles in Disharmony’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 10/05, 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/05/051001.html.  
36 See Anneli Albi, ‘Selected EU Judgments by CEE Constitutional Courts: Lessons on How (Not) to Amend 
Constitutions?’ (2007) 3 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 39-58.  
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the Czech Republic’.37 Their violation would in the Court’s opinion ‘simultaneously mean the 
violation of the values on which the materially understood constitutionality of the Czech 
Republic rests’.38 It would later come as a surprise to some Europeanists who assisted in 
drafting the integration clauses of the accession states’ constitutions to make the application 
of EU law more effective39 that this law could exhibit some deeply problematic features 
which they would like to see resisted.40  
The 2012 decision of the same court, which declared a judgment of the ECJ to be ultra vires, 
therefore appeared strikingly inconsistent with the line taken by the earlier Czech court.41 
Although one should not read too much into the judgment, which was addressed primarily to 
the domestic context,42 there is something deeply disconcerting about it: the reaction it 
provoked in certain circles. In his speech to the Hessen Regional Parliament delivered shortly 
after the Czech Constitutional Court’s decision, the German Constitutional Court President 
Andreas Vosskuhle praised the decision. In his opinion it ‘followed’ the German example. 43 
Anybody who has read the Czech decision and has even a sketchy knowledge of the German 
jurisprudence concerning ultra vires review of the EU, however, would agree that this was 
utter nonsense.44 The two judgments are similar only at the most superficial level: as 
examples of national courts’ ‘resistance’. The form, and ultimately the substance, of both 
decisions could not be more different. Damian Chalmers then took the decision as an example 
of the ECJ’s arrogance when engaging national constitutional courts.45 But that view is also 
mistaken, I believe.46  
I would suggest that these are not simple misreadings of the decision and its context. I worry 
that, yet again, there is no serious engagement with post-communist Europe. Its experience is 
taken only to confirm the existing opinions and biases, formed quite independently of what is 
going on there. One is reminded of a similar ‘dialogue’ that had been taking place between 
some economists in the West and their reform-minded colleagues behind the Iron Curtain 
since the early 1950s.47 The opinions of Eastern economists did not matter in that “dialogue”; 
what was needed in the West was empirical facts to be fed into their models of economic 
                                                
37 Judgment of 26 November 2008, Pl. ÚS 19/08, Lisbon Treaty I. The English translation is available at the 
Czech Constitutional Court’s website, http://www.usoud.cz/view/pl-19-08.  
38 Ibid, paragraph 209.  
39 See n 36.  
40 See Anneli Albi, ‘Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession Conditionality and Post-
Accession Conundrums’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 46-69. 
41 Analysed most recently in Michal Bobek and David Kosař, ‘Report on the Czech Republic and Slovakia’ in 
Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino (eds), The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws: A 
Constitutional Comparative Perspective (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing 2010), 157-190.  
42 That is how I read the judgment: see my case comment, ‘Playing with Matches: the Czech Constitutional 
Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires’ (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law 
Review 323-337.  
43 ‘Bewahrung und Erneuerung des Nationalstaats im Lichte der Europäischen Einigung’, 1 March 2012, Hessen 
Regional Parliament (Landtag), Wiesbaden.  
44 Commenting on the decision of his former colleagues, Jiří Malenovský (now an ECJ judge) characterized it as 
a ‘caricature of the German jurisprudence’. See Jiří Malenovský, ‘60 let Evropských společenství: od 
francouzského „supranacionálního“ smluvního projektu k jeho německému „podústavnímu“ provádění’ (2012) 
151 Právník 673-722.  
45 Damian Chalmers, ‘The European Court of Justice has taken on huge new powers as ‘enforcer’ of last week’s 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. Yet its record as a judicial institution has been little 
scrutinized’, EUROPP Blog 7 March 2012, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/07/european-court-of-
justice-enforcer/.  
46 See Komárek, n 42, 335-336.  
47 See Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal, ‘Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge: The 
Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism’ (2002) 108 American Journal of Sociology 310-352.  
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equilibrium (in the case of mathematical neoclassical economists),48 or to be used by early 
neoliberals as indisputable evidence that a planned economy cannot work.49 This “dialogue” 
(and its importance for the formation of neoliberal economic thought) was never 
acknowledged in the West since, from its point of view, no dialogue actually existed. It was 
just a flow of information (and yes, some teaching and learning – from the West to the East).  
This exchange, whatever one calls it, had a real influence on the formation of economic 
policies in post-communist Europe and the establishment of the (neo)liberal consensus in 
1989 and the early 1990s.50 This relates to the second theme I would like to explore here, 
which concerns the economic part of post-communist Europe’s transformation and its 
ultimate accession to the EU. As I will explain, it cannot be ignored, even if we focus on 
constitutionalism and democracy. Quite to the contrary: we cannot understand the problems 
of EU constitutionalism without understanding its political economy.  
3 Suppressing	  Social	  Conflicts	   	  
The apparent triumph of liberal democracy and market economy had another, and for the 
present crisis of the EU much more important, consequence: the losers in the period of 
democratic transition had no voice in the process; in some instances, they even contributed to 
their own degradation in the name of a ‘better future’ at the end of history. One cannot 
overlook, once again, the deeper continuity of the post-communist experience with the times 
of the building of an actually existing socialism, noted above. One commentator from the 
West for example wrote:  
If the people of formerly communist Europe can endure the hardship that the policies of 
stabilization, liberalization, and institution-building inflict, they will emerge at the end 
of the greatest upheaval that any democratic government has ever brought deliberately 
upon its own people, at the other end of the valley of tears, into the sunlight of Western 
freedom and prosperity.51 
Tears there were, indeed, but to speak against economic reforms meant to speak against the 
Return to Europe and democratic transformation at the same time, since both were tied to 
market economy. Moreover, the market building project was identified with state building52 
                                                
48 Bockman and Eyal mention Harvard professor Wassily Leontief as an example (Bockman and Eyal, n 47, 329-
330.  
49 Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman are discussed by Bockman and Eyal, n 47, 331-337.  
50 See n 17 and more generally Johanna Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of 
Neoliberalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2011). The term ‘neoliberalism’ is now used in ideological 
battles much like ‘communism’ used to be. In this essay, I essentially mean ‘a theory of political economic 
practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and 
free trade’. The role of the state is minimal. See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: OUP 
2005), 2. It is notoriously difficult to define neoliberalism today; see eg Philip Mirowski, ‘Postface: Defining 
Neoliberalism’ in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwethe (eds), The Road From Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective (Cambridge, Mass and London: HUP 2009), 417-455.  
51 Michael Mandelbaum, in his introduction to Shafiqul Islam and Michael Mandelbaum (eds), Making Markets: 
Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press 1993), 15.  
52 See Stephen Holmes, ‘The Politics of Economics in the Czech Republic’ (1995) 4 East European 
Constitutional Review 52-55. 
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and also concerned the much desired (re-)modernization of post-communist society on its 
return to Europe from its ‘Eastern kidnap’.53  
The experience of some dissidents also spoke against any state intervention in the market 
economy. Justifying his original support for Václav Klaus’ neoliberal reforms, Havel said, 
‘We wanted a normal market system of economics’.54 As Barbara Falk explains, ‘[n]ormal 
meant the opportunity to unburden oneself of politics because a normal situation was one 
where economics dominated politics, and not the other way around’,55 as experienced in 
planned economies before 1989.  
Those most affected by the reforms thus sometimes supported them in the name of the 
‘greater good’. This is best illustrated by the example of the Polish opposition movement, 
Solidarity, which started out as an independent trade union in 1980, but was in fact a coalition 
of workers (such as its leader and later President of Poland Lech Wałesa) and liberal 
intellectuals (Adam Michnik, Bronisław Geremek or Tadeusz Mazowiecki).56 As David Ost 
documents in his study of Solidarity’s transformation after 1989,57 as soon as the prospect of 
democratic reform’s success became clear, the leaders of Solidarity - mostly the liberal 
intellectuals - started to play down the importance of the active citizenry (‘civil society’), 
where the labour class had a prominent place, and began to stress the foundations of 
democracy in private property and free market.58 Some of them, such as Adam Michnik, even 
presented labour activism as a threat to democracy and future reforms. Liberal intellectuals of 
Solidarity thus radically reinterpreted the notion of civil society, the central conceptual 
innovation of the Central European dissident movement.59 While in the early 1980s they saw 
labour activism as ‘the embodiment of the free, autonomous public activity that they believed 
to be the grounding of a democratic system’,60 in 1989 and thereafter, they defended their 
neoliberal economic reforms, which were manifestly against the interests of the labour class, 
‘on the ground that this was what building civil society [and hence democracy] was all 
about’.61 They came from the adoration of labour to the fear and even disdain of it.  
As Ost emphasizes throughout the 1990s, ‘Solidarity consistently sought to organize labor 
anger away from class cleavages and toward identity cleavages instead’.62 This is what 
explains Solidarity’s metamorphosis into illiberal populist right, represented by the Kaczynski 
brothers, and similar developments in other post-communist countries,63 including Hungary, 
which is now troubling European liberals so greatly,64 or the Czech Republic, which is all the 
                                                
53 See text to n 23 and also Eyal, n 15, 160-169, describing the rituals of post-communist life, consisting for 
example of conducting a small, but well-attended and televised ceremony celebrating the fact that the Czech 
Republic’s budget year 1993 ended in surplus.  
54 Quoted in Falk, n 3, 331 (emphasis on ‘normal’ added by Falk). 
55 Ibid.  
56 On the history of Solidarity see Ost, n 18.  
57 The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press 2005) 
58 See Ost, n 57, 40-43. 
59 See n 18 
60 Ibid, 41. 
61 Ibid, 192.  
62 Ibid, 35. For a restatement see David Ost, ‘The Invisibility and Centrality of Class After Communism’ (2009) 
22 International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 497-515. 
63 Briefly explored in Ost, n 57, 180-184, with further references. See also Ivan Krastev, ‘The Strange Death of 
the Liberal Consensus’ (2007) 18 Journal of Democracy 56-63 (written even before Orbán’s Fidesz took power 
in Hungary!).  
64 See n 10 – although it must be stressed that Müller is far from blind to ‘the plight of the victims of post-
communism’- at 9. It however seems that Müller ascribes these plights to the failure of reforms, leading to 
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more peculiar, since it was one and the same person, Václav Klaus,  who first imposed his ‘no 
alternative’ on the citizens only to turn to nationalism when these policies started to create 
true social conflicts.65 
All this could sound like a biased leftist critique of economic reforms that were ‘necessary’,66 
but Ost’s argument is wider than that. It is a strong defence of the centrality of class conflict 
in liberal democracy. Ost explains that ‘[h]istorically, mobilization of non-elites along class 
lines has been the best way to secure democratic inclusion since in this way, interests can be 
negotiated, with the differing sides recognized as essential parts of the same community’.67 
He is acutely aware of the controversy concerning the relevance of social class in today’s 
politics; he nevertheless warns that ‘[t]o say class is no longer relevant because it no longer 
explains social dynamics or because we live in a post-modern world where such narratives no 
longer make sense - this is to concede the terrain of class organization to others’.68 
Marco Dani argues that the post-war constitutional settlement in Western Europe was able to 
accommodate class struggles into its structures, particularly through political rights, which 
‘could give rise to a type of adversary politics primarily centred on redistribution’,69 but is 
very pessimistic about the ability of the EU to replicate such structures at the supranational 
level. At the same time, he refers to recent findings of Neil Fligstein, who in his Euroclash 
finds that three main constituencies emerge from the adjustment of European society to 
economic integration: the winners (or insiders), losers (or outsiders), and most importantly, a 
more ambiguous swing constituency, ‘situational Europeans’.70  
Dani opines that these three constituencies ‘have not evolved in social classes and political 
parties’, but that is only partially true. Such conflicts do get articulated politically, but at the 
national level.71 Like post-communist Europe, where real social conflicts arising from the 
reforms were suppressed in the name of the Return to Europe (and later translated into the 
language of illiberal nationalism), in the context of Dani’s analysis, Europe plays the part of a 
protective shield from real issues in a different way: it allows organizing anger away from the 
conflict between those who benefit from integration and those who are the losers in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘capitalism, in its worst, corruption-ridden form to boot’ rather than their ‘success’, if success is measured by 
what at least some Western advisers wanted to achieve at the beginning of transition.  
65 See Seán Hanley, The New Right in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-Wing Politics, 1989–
2006 (London and New York: Routledge 2006), chapter 8.  
66 But see also Maurice Glasman, ‘The Great Transformation: Polanyi, Poland and the Terrors of Planned 
Spontaneity’ in Christopher GA Bryant, Edmund Mokrszychi (eds), The New Great Transformation? Change 
and Continuity in East-Central Europe (London and New York: Routledge 1994), 191-217, with a comment by 
Steven Lukes, ‘Is there an Alternative to Market Utopianism?’, ibid, 218-221. 
67 Ost (2009), n 62, 498. See also Ost, n 57, 29-34. For a historical argument in this vein see Gregory M 
Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in 
Interwar Europe (New York and Oxford: OUP 1991).  
68 Ost, n 57, 204.  
69 See Marco Dani, ‘Rehabilitating Social Conflicts in European Public Law’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 
621. Dani does not use the term ‘class conflict’ and uses ‘social conflict instead’, in the context of his study they 
can be considered synonymous. For a wider political-historical argument see Stefano Bartolini, The Political 
Mobilization of the European Left, 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage (Cambridge: CUP 2000).  
70 Dani, n 69, 638. Neil Fligstein, Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe (Oxford: 
OUP 2008), 211-213. 
71 See Hanspeter Kriesi, The Mobilization of the Political Potentials Linked to European Integration by National 
Political Parties, paper presented at the Conference on “Euroscepticism”, Amsterdam, 1-2 July 2005 and also 
Hanspeter Kriesi et al, West European Politics in the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: CUP 2008). See also Cf. 
Albena Azmanova, ‘After the Left–Right (Dis)continuum: Globalization and the Remaking of Europe’s 
Ideological Geography’ (2011) 5 International Political Sociology 384-407.  
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process, and navigate this conflict against Europe, or what is worse, the German Europe.72 It 
is mostly because the EU is seen as the problem, rather than its solution. To turn Europe into 
the solution of many a European citizen’s precarious situation, however, would require 
opening the question of what Europe should represent – something that concerns the EU as a 
whole, and not just its post-communist part.  
4 European	  Union’s	  Civil izing	  Mission	  
The difficulty of translating social conflicts arising from the process of European integration 
into something other than identitary politics of Euroscepticism and nationalism73 reflects a 
deeper problem affecting European democracies today: their decreasing capacity to make 
political choices over their macroeconomic policies,74 resulting in their inability to address 
the social question: ‘the capacity of a society (known in political terms as a nation) to exist as 
a collectivity linked by relations of interdependency’.75  
Many instruments of economic and social policy were de-politicized in postwar Western 
Europe, and European integration was an important part of this process (together with the 
globalization of trade and capital movement liberalization).76 This in fact reduced the capacity 
of governments to negotiate social conflicts at a time when the social compromise could no 
longer be paid out by the real economy at the end of the 1970s. This is what explains the rise 
of neoliberalism at that time.77 At the level of ideas, particularly political and constitutional 
theory, some influential understandings of the EU have helped to promote this 
‘depoliticization’ of economic policy by supranational integration.78 One presents the EU in 
terms of political liberalism, stripped of any critical analysis of the redistributive effects 
which the constitutional arrangements can bring about. Another is focused on the Market and 
places the legitimatory processes exclusively at the level of the Member States.  
Many accounts of the EU are concerned with the limitations of a nation state or the need to 
discipline its vices. Jan Werner Müller, in his intellectual history of democracy in Europe, 
argues that ‘European integration was part and parcel of the new “constitutionalist ethos”, 
with its inbuilt distrust of popular sovereignty’, which developed in post-war Europe in 
reaction to the horrors of Nazism.79 The EU (and the European Convention) thus served as an 
external check on states whose political regimes Müller describes as ‘constrained 
                                                
72 See Ulrich Beck (Rodney Livingstone transl), German Europe (Cambridge: Polity 2013).  
73 For an analysis of this conundrum see Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, (Ciaran Cronin transl), Cosmopolitan 
Europe (Cambridge: Polity 2007).  
74 See Wolfgang Streeck and Daniel Mertens, ‘Public Finance and the Decline of State Capacity in Democratic 
Capitalism’ in Schäfer and Streeck, n 13, 26-58.  
75 Robert Castel (Richard Boyd transl and ed), From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the 
Social Question (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers 2003), xx. See also Alexander Somek, 
‘The Social Question in a Transnational Context’ LEQS Paper No. 39/2011, available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPapers.aspx.  
76 See Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: OUP 1999), 28-42 and also 
Scharpf, n 13, 109-114 or Christopher J Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States 
(Oxford: OUP 2012), chapter 4. 
77 See Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton UP 2012), chapter 6 or Mirowski and Plehwethe, n 50. For a (much) less charitable reading 
see Harvey, n 50, chapter 2.  
78 On the notion of depoliticization see Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul 1964).  
79 See Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press 
2011), 148-149.  
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democracies’.80 It resonates in the literature on EU constitutionalism too: in the work of 
Miguel Maduro, who partly translates federalist arguments into the context of European 
integration (without explicitly saying so),81 and partly promotes extending democratic 
representation beyond state borders,82 or Mattias Kumm and Daniel Halberstam, for whom 
the EU represents a space where various constitutional principles can compete with each other 
(Halberstam’s ‘constitutional heterarchy)83 or be harmonized through the Dworkinian 
principle of ‘best fit’ (Kumm).84  
What they all have in common is their use of the vocabulary of liberal democracy stripped of 
its economic/social dimension: as if constitutional democracy in the EU travelled back before 
its post-war transformation analysed by Marco Dani.85 Mattias Kumm’s idea of ‘legitimatory 
trinity’ of global public law (which he applies in the context of international law and EU law 
too), according to which human rights, democracy and the rule of law have become the 
largely uncontested criteria of law’s claim to legitimate authority, illustrate this well.86 One is 
reminded of another trinity: liberté, egalité, fraternité, where the last can be translated as 
solidarity,87 to realise the contrast here.88 In reality, until very recently solidarity was given 
scant attention in EU political and constitutional theory.89 
Joseph Weiler’s ideas of ‘constitutional tolerance’90 and Europe as Community91 are different 
in that they genuinely seek to re-think the liberal tradition of constitutionalism and come up 
                                                
80 See also P Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008). On the postwar debates on democracy see Martin Conway and Volker Depkat, ‘Towards 
a European History of the Discourse of Democracy: Discussing Democracy in Western Europe, 1945-60’ in 
Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds), Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave 2010), 132-156. 
81 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if this is As Good As It Gets?’, in Joseph HH 
Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 
2003), 74-102. 
82 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the European Constitution: 
Economic Freedom and Political Rights’ (1997) 3 European Law Journal 55-82 and Miguel P Maduro, We the 
Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution. A Critical Reading of Article 
30 of the EC Treaty (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998), chapter 5.  
83 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the 
United States’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law and Global Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009), 326-355.  
84 ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the 
Constitutional Treaty’, (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262-307.  
85 See text to n 69. On the liberal separation of politics and economy see Michael Walzer, ‘Liberalism and the 
Art of Separation’ (1984) 12 Political Theory 315-330 or Ellen M Wood, Democracy against Capitalism: 
Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), chapter 1.  
86 ‘Legitimatory trinity’ was the term used by Mattias Kumm in a presentation at the LSE, European Public Law 
Theory seminar, 19 January 2012.  
87 This is an oversimplification in some sense, since there is a controversy in France concerning the ‘reduction’ 
of fraternity to solidarity. See e.g. Michel Borgetto, La notion de fraternité en droit public français: Le passé, le 
présent et l’avenir de la solidarité (Paris: L.G.D.J. 1993), 628.  
88 But it can be indicative of the dominance of Anglo-American political theory, since as Nathan Glazer notes in 
his Foreword to Pierre Rosanvallon (Barbara Harshaw transl), The New Social Question: Rethinking the Welfare 
State (Princeton: Princeto UP 2000), ix, ‘only the first two – liberty and equality – have received the 
wholehearted support of American during our two-hundred year history’.  
89 See Andrea Sangiovanni, ‘Solidarity in the European Union’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 213-
241, 213. 
90 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg’, in Weiler and Wind, n 81. 
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with a new vocabulary, focusing on the notions of community (among states) and 
transnational human intercourse stripped of nationality and state affiliation as its principal 
referent.92 Besides its other problems, which I consider in the next section, it nevertheless 
shares the disregard of the social question in European constitutionalism.  
Besides the danger of disregarding the social question, which can lead to its translation into 
the language of illiberal nationalism, there is another problem with this essentially liberal-
democratic reading of the EU: it hides the fact that it could be the current constitutional 
culture of the EU itself, exemplified by its present turn to executive dominance at the expense 
of control by parliaments and courts, which has contributed to the present turn to 
authoritarianism in some states.93 To call the EU into action to defend the principles of liberal 
democracy, as Jan Werner Müller has recently done,94 in fact helps the EU to maintain the 
questionable path to its own form of ‘authoritarian liberalism’ exercised by the heads of 
(some) states together with the ECB, IMF and financial markets.95  
The second large group of theories focuses on the market. It comes in two versions: one 
trying to separate the market from politics, effectively arguing for an ordo-liberal economic 
constitution;96 another seeing the EU as an additional regulatory space, where no contested 
choices are being made.97 They correspond to the idea that it is still the Member States that 
are in control – as the ‘Masters of the Treaty’, who are able to legitimize policy decisions 
made at the supranational level that have redistributive effects.98  
It is however less and less possible to imagine the EU Member States as independent of the 
EU and its institutional structures. As Chris Bickerton powerfully argues, the very 
understanding of the state has changed in Europe due to the interdependence of the EU and its 
Member States, both horizontal and vertical.99 The current debates in the United Kingdom 
concerning the UK’s departure from the EU provide compelling evidence of this.100  
But there is a spiritual argument too, going beyond pragmatism of those accustomed to the 
cold language of cost-benefit analysis. In my view, it is exactly the many people in post-
communist Europe – now 11 of the 28 Member States – who see the EU as a civilising project 
                                                                                                                                                   
91 Suggested by Weiler in his seminal ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403-2483, 
reprinted in Weiler’s collection of essays The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes Have An Emperor?’ 
and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: CUP 1999), 10-101.  
92 Ibid, 90-96. 
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Stealth (Oxford: OUP 2005).  
98 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice of Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(London: UCL Press 1998). For a sophisticated articulation of this understanding of the EU in terms of public 
law see Peter Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford: Oxford 
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99 See Bickerton, n 76.  
100 For mere legal/constitutional difficulties see Adam Lazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the European Union and 
Alternatives to Membership’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 523-540.  
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along Müller’s line of reasoning. Whenever concerns are raised about democracy (or the rule 
of law and human rights, to invoke the other central values of political liberalism), people 
point to the fact that the return to past totalitarian is not possible because of the EU – 
irrespective of the actual capability of the EU to prevent that.  
Furthermore, seeing the EU as a market ignores policies in fields such as the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, which increasingly emancipate themselves from their 
(purportedly) original Single Market rationale. Both distorted pictures of the EU – the 
political-liberal and the market-centred - are nicely captured in the recent UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s ‘Europe Speech’. In his view, the ‘main, overriding purpose’ of the EU 
today is ‘not to win peace, but to secure prosperity’ through victory in ‘a new global race of 
nations’.101  
Here I do not want to pursue a rather predictable critique concerning the fact that, with 
Croatians joining the EU, mass killing and atrocities in war will again be something many 
living European citizens know from their own experience (being on both sides, one must add). 
For them, the credo ‘never again’ is not a platitude. Nor do I want to remind people that for 
post-communist Europe membership of the EU is an assurance that they will have more (if 
never complete) freedom to negotiate their relationship with Russia.  
It is in the link between peace in Europe and the ability of European states to negotiate the 
relationship between markets and people and to address the social question that the civilizing 
project of political liberals meets the Market.102 Among the reasons for World War II, which 
ultimately made European integration possible, was the subordination of ‘the substance of 
society itself to the laws of the market’.103 As Alexander Somek notes, ‘European intellectual 
and political history has been witness to a variety of attempts to find a “third way” over and 
against the alternative between unbridled capitalism on the one hand and authoritarian 
socialism on the other’.104 Western Europe’s embedded capitalism provided a response which 
had worked for some time – during the period of the trente glorieuses (roughly after the War 
to the mid-1970s).105 Europe’s turn to neoliberalism at the end of the 1970s seemed to provide 
a remedy for its failure (which was again due to many external factors).106 That seemed to 
work until the present crisis, which threatens the very existence of the integration project.  
The EU and its institutions were indispensible in both periods (before the end of the 1970s 
and after that) to the extent that the current Member States have transformed into entities that 
cannot meaningfully govern their societies without being part of the Union.107 That however 
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102 See Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Crisis in Context: Democratic Capitalism and its Contradictions’ in Schäfer and 
Streeck, n 13, 262-286.  
103 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: 
Beacon Press 1957 [1944]), 71. For a summary of Polanyi’s analysis see Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer, 
‘Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi in a Hayekian Setting’ (2012) 66 International 
Organization 429-455, 432-434.  
104 Alexander Somek, ‘Europe: Political, Not Cosmopolitan’ Discussion Paper of the WZB Rule of Law Center 
SP IV 2011-803, http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwwzbrlc/spiv2011803.htm, 35. See also Alexander Somek, 
‘What Is Political Union?’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 561-580.  
105 See Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton UP 2007).  
106 See Bickerton, n 76, 125-131, Gareth Dale & Nadine El-Enany, ‘The Limits of Social Europe: EU Law and 
the Ordoliberal Agenda’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 613-650.  
107 See Bickerton, n 76. In this respect Bickerton takes the previous analysis by Andrew Moravcsik (n 98) to a 
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means that the EU cannot escape this question and hide behind the walls of technocratic 
expertise or the vicissitudes of global financial markets. The question of balance between 
markets and people, implied in the European social question, is deeply political and must be 
answered.108 What contributes to the depoliticization of this question, however, is the 
prevailing understanding of European constitutionalism, which reflects the abovementioned 
truncated visions of European integration.  
5 Disenchanted	  Constitutionalist 	   	  
If there is one person who has ensured that the constitutional reading of European integration 
is firmly established in the studies of European integration across various disciplines, it is 
Joseph Weiler. Most of his works collected in The Constitution of Europe109 provide the 
starting point for students of European integration, especially those interested in its deeper 
ethos.  
Weiler analysed what I call above the political-liberal and market narratives of European 
integration. Only rarely, however, does he touch upon the social question. In the 
‘Transformation of Europe’ he gets closest to this issue when analysing the impact of the 
Commission’s One Market Strategy.110 Weiler observes:  
A ‘single European market’ is a concept which still has the power to stir. But it is also a 
‘single European market’. It is not simply a technocratic program to remove the 
remaining obstacles to the free movement of all factors of production. It is at the same 
time a highly politicized choice of ethos, ideology, and political culture: the culture of 
‘the market’.111  
This theme is later largely unexplored, however. Most of Weiler’s intellectual energy in the 
1990s and 2000s was devoted to the political-liberal shortcomings of the EU, particularly its 
failure to take fundamental rights seriously and its simultaneous adventures in documentary 
constitution-building.112 The potentially corrupting effects of the Market ideology on the 
political ethos of European integration are not taken up.113 Sometimes it even seems that 
Weiler believes in a sort of natural law of market integration, the virtues (and vices) of which 
are not critically examined.114  
Weiler has only recently grown more perceptive of the vices of the Market. His work in 
progress, ‘On the Distinction between Values and Virtues in the Process of European 
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Integration’, takes issue with them at several points.115 Weiler thus laments the Market’s ‘very 
internal set of values and ethos of competition and material efficiency coupled with the 
culture of rights’, which all contribute to ‘that matrix of personal materialism, self-
centeredness, Sartre style ennui and narcissism in a society which genuinely and laudably 
values liberty and human rights’.116 Through this peculiar ‘culture of rights’ the Union, in 
Weiler’s words, ‘puts into place a political culture which cultivates self-interested 
individuals’, who cannot ‘internalize that in democracy, them’, meaning the failing or corrupt 
government, ‘is actually us’.117  
This last point reaches far beyond the critique of the Market and concerns the political-liberal 
vision of the EU as well. It goes even farther, to the very foundations of the integration 
project. These, according to Weiler, shall consist in ‘[r]edefining human relations, the way 
individuals relate to each other and to their community’.118 This is the core of Weiler’s 
critique and, in my view, the core of his oeuvre concerning European integration. As such it 
would require a much more detailed examination, which cannot be pursued here. What I want 
to do instead, in line with the broader theme of this essay, is to look at the experience of post-
communist Europe, from the times both before and after 1989. It can point up some important 
lessons, if only in the form of a cautionary tale, to those in search of Europe’s deeper ethos.  
6 Existential	  Revolution	  that	  Failed	  	  
The dissidents’ notion of civil society, which bridged the Anglo-American Lockean and the 
continental Hegelian traditions, tends to be considered their most important contribution to 
political theory.119 It encompasses active citizens who get involved in public affairs outside 
official political structures, particularly party politics.  
Yet, civil society in post-communist countries is weak.120 As noted above, moreover, the 
overall condition of democracy in these countries seems rather bleak as well.121 How can we 
explain this? Contrary to what some people believe, I do not think the reason for this lies in 
deep continuities between the ‘totalitarian’ past and ‘liberal’ present, or, more precisely, this 
continuity is not the decisive reason for the worrying state of post-communist democracies. 
The problem lies in the very notion of civil society (and antipolitics) as developed by 
dissidents and its ability to bring about what it promises.  
The pursuit of the idea of civil society was, as Barbara Falk notes, a ‘carefully constructed 
political strategy’, which took account of geopolitical realities and the apparent impossibility 
of overthrowing the communist regime by force – as the 1956 and 1968 revolutions had 
taught Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak oppositionist. The target of dissidents’ strategy, 
aimed at civil society, was ‘not the party-state (this was the grave error of the revisionists in 
                                                
115 Available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/2010IILJColloquium.asp and quoted here with the author’s 
permission. Parts of this essay have already been published, as I indicate in further footnotes.  
116 Ibid, 41.  
117 Joseph Weiler, ‘Editorial: Individual and Rights: The Sour Grapes’ (2010) 21 European Journal of 
International Law 277-280, 279. For a critique pursued in this vein see Alexander Somek, Individualism: An 
Essay on the Authority of the European Union (Oxford: OUP 2008).  
118 Weiler, n 115, 2. 
119 See n 18.  
120 Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: CUP 2003). 
121 See sections 2 and 3 supra.  
17 
all three countries) but the people themselves’.122 The strategy thus did not intend to challenge 
the regime itself.  
The Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia thus made a simple plea to the communist 
authorities: to abide by the international obligations to respect fundamental human and 
political rights which they entered into by the Final Act of the Helsinki Accord in 1975.123 
Charter 77’s spiritual authority was Jan Patočka, a philosophy professor who was officially 
excluded from teaching, but kept giving unofficial seminars in his living room throughout the 
1950s and 1960s.124 These were attended by many later dissidents of the Charter 77 
movement. Václav Havel read Patočka as a teenager, but entered into a philosophical 
conversation with him only once: before they were interrogated by the State Police when 
Charter 77 was published in January 1977. After an interrogation lasting several hours 
Patočka died, and it was therefore their ‘Last Conversation’.125 
Charter 77’s appeal to the rest of society was primarily to ‘live in true’. In Václav Havel’s 
famous metaphor, it could for example mean that a greengrocer who had been obediently 
placing in the window of his shop the slogan calling on workers of the world to unite would 
stop doing so – and thus liberate himself. If everybody did so, the post-totalitarian control of 
society would break down. That was the ‘power of the powerless’ in Havel’s view.126  
The reason Havel’s essay resonated so much in the West and still speaks to (some of) us 
today was that Havel did not limit his ethical claim to the people living in the conditions of 
post-totalitarianism. What he called for was nothing less than an ‘existential revolution’, 
aimed at the crisis of contemporary society as a whole – liberal West and post-totalitarian 
East alike.127 This revolution, in Havel’s words, ‘should provide hope of a moral 
reconstitution of society, which means a radical renewal of the relationship of human beings 
to ... the ‘human order’, which no political order can replace’.128 In fact, Havel was rather 
sceptical of the ‘framework of classical parliamentary democracy’ and suggested the notion of 
post-democracy, which however needed to be developed through practice.129 The existential 
revolution would lead to ‘[a] new experience of being, a renewed rootedness in the universe, a 
newly grasped sense of higher responsibility, a newfound inner relationship to other people 
and to the human community’.130 
We do not need to go into details of Havel’s diagnosis of the crisis of modernity, based on his 
reading of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.131 Havel’s spiritual affinity to Heidegger 
needs to be mentioned for another reason. As Aviezer Tucker notes, ‘the dissident emphasis 
on personal authenticity, antimodernism, and dismissal of institutions as inherently alienating 
and corrupt prevented Havel and his fellow dissidents from understanding the significance of 
reconstructing the institutions of the state, especially those that should enforce the rule of 
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law’.132 These misunderstandings proved fatal after 1989, at least to those who hoped that the 
‘Velvet Revolution’ would bring about a true moral reconstitution of society. Instead, to use 
Tucker’s vitriolic but sadly accurate characterization, ‘[i]n a state of normative confusion and 
political disorientation, and in a political environment lacking a developed and active civil 
society, the former dissidents did little to prevent the resurgence of old patterns of political 
corruption and civil passivity’.133 The Velvet Revolution resulted in the Velvet Corruption,134 
further contributing to the frustration of the people of post-communist countries.  
The dissidents were equally suspect of the very notion of politics. The notions of civil society 
and the existential revolution were therefore connected by ‘antipolitics’ or ‘nonpolitical 
politics’.135 They appealed to morality and virtue and held in deep contempt Machiavellian 
technology of power. In the second important essay written before 1989, Politics and 
Conscience, Havel describes what he means by that:  
I favor ‘antipolitical politics’, that is, politics not as the technology of power and 
manipulation, of cybernetic rule over humans or as the art of the utilitarian, but politics 
as one of the ways of seeking and achieving meaningful lives, of protecting them and 
serving them. I favor politics as practical morality, as service to the truth, as essentially 
human and humanly measured care for our fellow humans. It is, I presume, an approach 
which, in this world, is extremely impractical and difficult to apply in daily life. Still, I 
know no better alternative.136  
Dissidents’ moral scruples about engaging in the ‘technology of power’ however meant that 
the societal transformation was soon dominated by more cynical technocrats coming from the 
‘grey zone’: people who neither actively supported nor opposed the communist regime,137 but 
who had the social capital necessary to guarantee them a place among the new elites. 
Politically, the most important ones were economists, who came to design reforms deemed 
necessary. As we noted above, with active support from the West they rejected any ‘third 
way’ and prescribed neoliberal reforms based on dogmatic readings of new gods: Hayek and 
von Mises primarily. Václav Klaus’ words are characteristic of the spirit of the time. He once 
remarked: ‘I often use the line by F.A. Hayek that the world is run by human action, not by 
human design. To talk about planning an economic system is to talk in old terms, and I find 
myself sometimes having to teach Westerners about what the market really means’.138 No 
wonder Klaus was called ‘a Lenin for the bourgeoisie’.139  
The free market philosophy therefore positively dissuaded citizens from engaging actively 
with politics outside elections. First, by excluding any discussion of possible ‘third ways’, 
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delegitimizing them as socialist and not making the radical break necessary to liberate from 
communism; second by the free market philosophy’s very desire to rule out any involvement 
by politics in the operation of the economy. This dogmatic approach found fertile ground in 
post-communist societies, since it continued on from their previous experience: there is no 
need for politics, since the Big Theory has answers for everything. This time for sure.  
7 The	  Hope	  for	  Europe?	  
Reading Weiler’s essay makes dissident experience – not from before 1989, but from the 
times of post-communist transformation - directly relevant to his concerns. Weiler’s call is in 
fact a call for ‘existential revolution’ in European integration, aiming at individuals, their 
mutual relationship and the relationship to community.140  
Like Jan Patočka and Václav Havel, Weiler appeals for citizens’ sacrifice and perfection. The 
former is present in Weiler’s understanding of values and virtues, the central categories of his 
essay. In his view, ‘a central part of [values’] allure’ is that they ‘contain an altruistic 
component. Virtues involve exertion. Things that demand sacrifice are cherished more than 
things that come easily. Sacrifice invests things with value’.141 The perfectionist emphasis on 
individual responsibility is also manifest in Weiler’s critique of ‘the culture of agency’, which 
releases individuals from their responsibility for solidarity and respect for human rights.142 
Weiler’s words, that these values ‘risk the impoverishment of private virtue’ since they 
‘responsibilize others, and deresponsibilize the self’,143 remind one of Havel’s critique of 
political parties, which release ‘the citizen from all forms of concrete and personal 
responsibility’.144 
Perfectionism forms Weiler’s prescription for Europe’s cure as well:  
The redress if any, may be found in greater attention to the spiritual dimensions to our 
lives and that of our children; the way we think of ours and educate, and cultivate theirs. 
Education to the necessary virtues of decency and true human solidarity, if achieved, 
can easily enough counteract the almost inevitable impact of the structure and process 
of governance. If achieved.145 
The last sentence is written in a sceptical key, like Havel’s call for antipolitical politics, 
quoted above.146 There is a danger of the same sad result, Velvet Corruption, which in 
Havel’s case ended in his ‘political tragedy’.147 Attractive as any ethical call can be for those 
who are already virtuous, it will not change the worrying course of European integration. It is 
not steered by philosophers like Weiler, but pragmatic technologicians of power: 
Merkiavellism, not virtuous antipolitics, is what governs in Europe.148 
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European constitutionalists should thus become more interested in the constitution of politics, 
or the political, no matter how unappealing the reference to Carl Schmitt may be.149 Political 
theorists of European integration should stop celebrating the ‘constrained democracy’, which 
forms one of the foundation stones of the European postwar constitutional settlement.150  
This of course does not explain how to politicize European integration and to save its peace 
mission which, contrary to what many people believe today, is not exhausted.151 Here, I think, 
to give citizens a vote about who is to become the President of the European Commission is 
too little.152 Those who write about and engage with European politics must make clear what 
the redistributive consequences of different decisions are. Different social classes may find 
more affinities irrespective of state borders and some (if not most) Germans may eventually 
find more sympathy with Greeks and others, once they find out about where the money really 
goes. The effort on the part of some European institutions to obscure this and to keep 
Europeans divided along national borders is remarkable.153 It is of course a much more 
complicated matter how this socio-economic division should be translated into politics, but 
that is where the real challenge lies.  
Coda:	  Reclaiming	  the	  Communist	  Past	  for	  Europe’s	  Future	  
There is one more lesson of post-communist Europe, however, reaching beyond the 
experience of dissidents: that of everybody living under the conditions of ‘really existing 
socialism’. It is still impossible to say in post-communist countries that life was not so bad 
before 1989 – if you acted as the obedient greengrocer putting the slogan in your window, of 
course. People in post-communist Europe are not expected to ‘have critically reflected 
memory of the communist past’.154 It seems that it is the West which imposes its own version 
of history on them. One transitologist, Anders Åslund, thus dismisses any complaint 
concerning the misery of catching up with the West in the following way: ‘[e]conomic decline 
and social hazards have been greatly exaggerated, since people have forgotten how awful 
communism was’.155 The dealing with the past in post-communist Europe does not seek to 
find and understand what it was really like to live in the ‘actually existing socialism’. Instead, 
it seeks to establish the myth of collective suffering, where it is ‘them’, the communists, who 
are responsible for the evil that emerged from the communist experiment.156 
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Voices that try to challenge such myths have only recently started being raised. Boris Buden, 
who can be considered one of them, acknowledges that communism was an emancipation 
project that failed.157 He however adds: ‘one should never feel ashamed for struggle for 
freedom. This applies today for all those, who tore down the Wall twenty years ago, but even 
more for those standing in front of the new ones today’.158 The pre-1989 experience of 
collectivism should not be considered something that needs to be ‘rectified’, or even as a sign 
of backwardness, which threatens the establishment of democracy,159 but something that 
could serve as a source to overcome ‘self-centred individualism’, rightly despised by Weiler.  
Here however, I have no advice to offer besides this reminder: Europe has a much better hope 
of overcoming its current crisis if it becomes spiritually united. This, however, cannot happen 
by East Central Europe trying to ‘return’ to the West or becoming one. It lies in the 
recognition of its unique experience, which is not to be overcome or, even worse, forgotten, 
but used as a reservoir for Europe’s future flourishing.  
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